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Can Micropolitan Areas Bridge the Urban/Rural Divide?
Sheila R. Foster ∗ & Clayton P. Gillette ∗∗
(24 Theoretical Inquiries in the Law, forthcoming)

There exists a well-known and significant divide between urban and rural
areas in the United States. The divide has been documented along multiple
dimensions. According to a 2018 Pew Research poll, urban areas have five times
the percentage of immigrants, 1 almost twice the number of college graduates, 2 and
a bit less than half the white population of rural counties. 3 Economically, urban
residents have about 50 percent more income than residents of rural counties. 4
Social attitudes vary widely between urban and rural residents. In the Pew
Research poll, sixty-one percent of urban county residents favored broad abortion
rights compared to 36 percent of rural county residents. 5 These variations in social
attitudes translate into political differences. In 2017, 62% of urban county residents
identified as Democrats, while 54% of rural county residents identified as
Republicans. 6 In the 2018 congressional elections, Democrats received 67.3
percent of the vote in counties that included a city of 1 million or more, but only
32.5 percent of the vote in counties that were not adjacent to a metropolitan area
and contained no town with a population in excess of 10,000. 7 The political divide
appears to be increasing. 8 In 2020, approximately two-thirds of voters who selfScott K. Ginsburg Professor of Urban Law and Policy, Professor of Public Policy, Georgetown
University. Thanks to participants in the Theoretical Inquiries in Law International Conference on
Regionalisms, and especially to Nestor Davidson and Ravit Havanel. Thanks also to Alec Monnie,
Georgetown MPP Candidate, for his excellent empirical research and analysis.
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Research Center 25(2018).
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Id. at 26.
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Id. at 24.
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Id. at 28.
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Id. at 30.
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Id. at 29.
7
Kenneth M. Johnson & Dante J. Scala, The Rural-Urban Continuum of Polarization:
Understanding the Geography of the 2018 Midterms, 18 FORUM 607, 615 (2021).
8
See, e.g., James G. Gimpel, Nathan Lovin, Bryant Moy & Andrew Reeves, The Urban–Rural
Gulf in American Political Behavior, 42 POL. BEHAV. 1343 (2020); Dante J. Scala, Kenneth M.
Johnson, & Luke T. Rogers, Red Rural, Blue Rural?: Presidential Voting Patterns in a Changing
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identified as rural voted for Trump, while only one-third of voters who identified
as urban did. 9
Moreover, differences in demographics, social attitudes, and political
leanings translate into animosity towards those with other characteristics. Sixtythree percent of urban residents believed that non-urban residents had a “very
negative” or “somewhat negative” view of urban dwellers. 10 Fifty-seven percent
of rural dwellers believed that non-rural residents had a “very negative” or
“somewhat negative” view of rural dwellers. 11 The urban/rural divide, therefore,
is not simply an issue of economic inequity, though it is certainly that. It also
reflects extensive political polarization. For both reasons, the divide is typically
seen as a detrimental characteristic of our national identity and capacity for both
economic development and civil political discourse.
In this Article we explore a subset of the urban/rural divide and propose a
mechanism for reducing its economic and political effects within that limited realm.
Most scholars and pundits who address the divide discuss it in binary terms. 12
These commentaries adopt federal agency definitions of rural communities in terms
of what they are not. The U.S. Census Bureau defines “rural” as territory and
population outside of urbanized areas and urban clusters. 13 The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) proclaims that rural counties comprise all
counties that are outside of a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). These
definitions, frequently incorporated into the literature on the divide between the
poles, 14 conflate rural areas that have very different characteristics along the same
dimensions on which the allegations of an urban/rural divide rest. In reality,
however, rural areas are diverse in a variety of ways, including politically,
economically, socially, and racially. These variations have implications for how
we think about the urban/rural divide and how we craft legal and policy
interventions to reduce its consequences.
We focus on that subset of rural areas that lie within what the Office of
Management and Budget defines as micropolitan areas. Micropolitan areas are
subsets of core based statistical areas (CBSA), which themselves are areas
containing a large population nucleus, or urban area, and adjacent communities that
Suzanne Mettler & Trevor Brown, The Growing Rural-Urban Divide and Democratic
Vulnerability, 699 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 130, 131 (2022).
10
Parker et al., supra note 1, at 38.
11
Id.
12
As an exception insofar as they speak of a continuum, see Johnson & Scala, supra note 7.
13
Michael Ratcliffe, Charlynn Burd, Kelly Holder, & Alison Fields, Defining Rural at the U.S.
Census Bureau: American Community Survey and Geography Brief, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2016)
https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/reference/ua/Defining_Rural.pdf.
14
See, e.g., Rick Su, Democracy in Rural America, 98 N.C. L. REV. 837, 841 (2020).
9
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are highly integrated with that nucleus. 15 If the largest urban area, or principal city,
within the CBSA has a population of 50,000 or more, then the area is classified as
a metropolitan statistical area. If the largest urban area within the CBSA has a
population between 10,000 and 50,000, the area is classified as a micropolitan
statistical area. 16 Rural jurisdictions within micropolitan areas, therefore, tend to
have at least geographical affinity with urban areas. But they also have some
economic affinity. Data suggest that rural areas within micropolitan regions do
better economically than rural areas unconnected to urban areas, though not as well
as the principal city within the micropolitan area. If the objective is to reduce the
economic, and perhaps the political divide of urban and rural areas, then
micropolitan areas may represent low-hanging fruit for redress.
There are over 550 micropolitan areas in the United States, situated in each
region of the country. They are as diverse as their metropolitan counterparts in
terms of their economic, demographic, and cultural characteristics. Some
micropolitan areas are major tourist and recreational attractions, while others focus
on manufacturing or a particular industry. Some have universities, knowledge
economies, and attract highly educated professionals. Some are close to major cities
and metropolitan areas, while others are far away. Every region of the country has
a thriving micropolitan area, each thriving in different ways. A few examples
illustrate this diversity.
Pecos, Texas is cited as one of the most successful micropolitan areas in the
country. 17 Pecos has 12,600 residents, a figure that has grown by nearly 4,000 since
2010, while its surrounding county (Reeves) has roughly 14,500. 18 Pecos
employment benefits from proximity to a basin from which shale oil has been
extracted, using hydraulic fracturing. Since the early 2010s the region has
experienced increased job growth, average annual pay, and the share that relatively
young firms represent of total employment. 19 Northeast of Pecos is another
successful micropolitan area consisting of Findlay, Ohio, with a stable population

2020 Standards for Delineating Core Based Statistical Areas, 86 FED. REG. 37,770 (Jul. 16,
2021) https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/07/16/2021-15159/2020-standards-fordelineating-core-based-statistical-areas.
16
Id. at § E.6.
17
Ross DeVol & Jonas Crews, Most Dynamic Micropolitans, Walton Family Foundation 7
(2019).
18
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State and County Quick Facts, Reeves County, Texas,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/reevescountytexas,pecoscitytexas/PST045221 (last
accessed Sept. 11, 2022).
19
See DeVol & Crews, supra note 17, at 16.
15
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of about 40,000, within Hancock County which has roughly 75,000 people. 20 The
Findlay area has become a “top expansion site” for warehousing, distribution,
logistics and transportation services. 21 The area is home to the University of
Findlay, which specializes in attracting students with associate degrees interested
in pursuing technical careers relevant to the local economy. 22
Calhoun, Georgia is one of the few highly prosperous micropolitan areas in
the southeast. Located within Gordon County, Calhoun is home to about 17,000 of
Gordon’s 58,000 residents. 23 Both the city and the county have increased in
population since 2010. The area has a thriving flooring industry and is home to two
of the largest flooring providers in the world. 24 That reputation has led to additional
investments in the flooring industry and has led to great wage growth in the
community. Its focus on a single industry, however, has placed it at risk when
economic downturns reduce housing construction. 25
Bozeman, Montana and Heber, Utah differ from the above areas in their
avenues to success. Bozeman is a relatively large micropolitan area, with a
population of about 50,000 within the surrounding Gallatin County of
approximately 122,000. 26 Both population figures are up significantly since 2010.
Tourism is a major driver of Bozeman’s economic success due to its proximity to
Yellowstone National Park and the fact that it is home to a large ski resort.
Bozeman is also the seat of Montana State University, which supports its clusters
of firms in the photonic/optic industry, biotechnology, and software and
information processing. 27 Similarly, Heber, Utah attracts significant tourism with
recreation amenities, but also benefits from its proximity to the Provo/Orem and
Salt Lake City metropolitan areas. 28 That proximity has allowed it to attract
professionals working in those metropolitan areas. 29 Heber has more than 17,000
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State and County Quick Facts, Hancock County, Ohio,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/hancockcountyohio,findlaycityohio/PST045221 (last
accessed Sept. 11, 2022).
21
DeVol & Crews, supra note 17, at 27.
22
Id. at 28.
23
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State and County Quick Facts, Gordon County, Georgia,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/gordoncountygeorgia,calhouncitygeorgia/PST04522
1 (last accessed Sept. 11, 2022).
24
DeVol & Crews, supra note 17, at 41.
25
Id.
26
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State and County Quick Facts, Gallitin County, Montana,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/gallatincountymontana,bozemancitymontana/PST04
5221 (last accessed Sept. 11, 2022).
27
Devol & Crews, supra note 17, at 32.
28
Devol & Crews, supra note 17, at 22.
29
Id.
20
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residents and the surrounding Wasatch County has more than 36,000. 30 The area’s
population doubled between 2000 and 2017, and has absorbed nearby Summit
County. 31 The Heber micropolitan area, including both counties, now totals around
80,000 residents. 32
Much of the literature on regional and urban economics focuses on
metropolitan areas as integrated economic units traversing multiple
municipalities. 33 That literature suggests that economic fortunes of localities in a
region – urban, suburban, and exurban – tend to rise and fall together. 34
Interdependence follows from the enhanced productivity that arises when colocation among firms and among employees facilitates sharing inputs, matching
employer needs and employee skills, and developing knowledge spillovers through
fortuitous but low-cost interactions. 35 Those characteristics of agglomeration –
increasing benefits to scale – are representative of dense, populous cities and
metropolitan areas. Indeed, city productivity scales with size, so that increasing the
size of the urban population generates a proportionally greater number of jobs,
patents, and high wages. 36
The benefits of scaling suggest that productivity would increase if we
fostered a few megacities rather than many medium to large cities. 37 But even if
that is correct as a matter of economic theory, many people are averse to living

30
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State and County Quick Facts, Wasatch County, Utah,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/wasatchcountyutah,hebercityutah/PST045221 (last
accessed Sept. 11, 2022).
31
Devol & Crews, supra note 17, at 22.
32
See Heber, Micropolitan Statistical Area in USA, CITY POPULATION (last accessed Sept. 11,
2022).
https://www.citypopulation.de/en/usa/metro/25720__heber/.
33
See Paul Mackun & Steven Wilson, U.S. Census Bureau, Population Distribution and Change:
2000 To 2010, 4 (2011), available at
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2011/dec/c2010br-01.html.
34
See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas,
48Stan. L. Rev. 1115, 1138-39 (1996); Clayton P. Gillette, The Conditions of Interlocal
Cooperation, 21 J.L. & POL. 365, 369-70 (2005); Paul D. Gottlieb, The Effects of Poverty on
Metropolitan Area Economic Performance: A Policy-Oriented Policy Review, in URBANSUBURBAN INTERDEPENDENCIES 21, 25-29 (Rosalind Greenstein & Wim Wiewel eds., 2000);
Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1830-31 (2003).
35
Gerald Carlino & William R. Kerr, Agglomeration and Innovation, in 5 HANDBOOK OF
REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 349 (Gilles Duranton, J. Vernon Henderson & William C.
Strange eds., 2015)
36
See GEOFFREY WEST, SCALE 275-78 (2017).
37
David Albouy, Kristian Behrens, Frédéric Robert-Nicoud & Nathan Seegert, The Optimal
Distribution of Population Across Cities, 110 J. URB. ECON. 102 (2019).

5

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4228701

within a dense megacity. 38 After all, the disamenities of density – congestion,
crime, disease, pollution – scale with size just as the benefits of density do. Some
individuals prefer to combine the benefits of agglomeration with the amenities of
the non-urban by residing outside the city, but working within. Other individuals
with the training and skills that support high salaries prefer to live in mid-sized
cities that offer a lower wage premium, but also offer a high level of desirable
amenities. 39 Since potential employees either cannot or do not desire to reside
within large cities, the amenities of non-urban areas explain why some regions grow
and others remain stagnant or decline. 40 Just as successful metropolitan areas
attract new residents and workers who want to capitalize on the geographical
concentration of others, 41 so, too, may residents of micropolitan regions prefer colocation with others who can increase human capital. But if smaller cities cannot
readily contain all the firms and individuals who would contribute to that increase,
then growth of principal cities within micropolitan areas would likely depend on
the ability of those cities to confer economic benefits in their adjacent rural
jurisdictions.
Our bolder claim is that interactions between the urban and rural parts of
micropolitan areas could also address the political aspects of urban-rural divide.
Those interactions occur in multiple venues. The need for firms in smaller principal
cities to attract employees from beyond the urban workforce facilitates the kinds of
social contact that at least some theory suggests is effective in dissipating political
polarization. Second, regional cooperation in the forms of interlocal subsidies or
joint action may be necessary to realize regional growth, and fostering cooperation
between rural and urban communities also creates the interactions that could
neutralize our current degree of polarization.
In developing this argument, we proceed along the following lines. The
next Section provides some data and narratives to illustrate the salience of urban
and rural proximity, specifically in the context of micropolitan areas. We explain
why micropolitan areas are an important window into understanding the
relationship urban and rural economies. In Section III, we infer from the data and
narratives what characteristics of micropolitan areas are likely to generate
See, e.g., Vicki Been, Comment on Professor Jerry Frug's The Geography of Community, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1109-10 (1996).
39
See Nathan Arnosti & Amy Liu, Why Rural America Needs Cities, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 30,
2018). See, e.g., Isabelle Bousquette, Chattanooga Finds Fresh Identity as a Tech, VC Hub, WALL
ST. J. (May 27, 2022) https://www.wsj.com/articles/chattanooga-finds-fresh-identity-as-a-tech-vchub-11653645602?page=1.
40
See Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence and the Consumer City, 43
URB. STUD. 1275 (2006).
41
See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, 12 J. ECON. PERSPS. 139, 148 (1998); Edward
L. Glaeser, Learning in Cities, 46 J. URB. ECON. 254 (1999).
38
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economic success, and recommend policies that would capture those benefits. We
note that some of these policies entail enhancing the economic position of the
principal city, and speculate that the interdependence of urban and rural
jurisdictions in micropolitan areas may, under some circumstances, justify principal
city subsidization of rural communities. Section IV suggests that increased
opportunities for economic interaction between city and non-urban residents that
result from city cooperation with non-urban neighbors may (and we underscore the
uncertainty) simultaneously reduce political polarization. Section V explores
obstacles to realizing the kinds of interlocal cooperation that we believe is
necessary to reduce the economic and political divide within micropolitan areas.
We conclude with suggestions for a research agenda to remedy the underdeveloped
study of micropolitan areas.
II. Urban-Rural Proximity and Micropolitan Regions
Despite the long-held conventional wisdom that urban and rural economies
are on diverging trajectories, recent research provides a more nuanced picture. Not
all cities and metropolitan area are thriving and not all rural areas are losing jobs
and population. 42 Instead, there is a great deal of diversity in the growth rates of
urban and rural areas. Census data reveal that both major metro areas (those with
populations exceeding 1 million) and rural areas have seen slower population
growth over the last decade, with some notable exceptions among large cities and
some micropolitan areas. 43 More specifically, rural growth is evident just beyond
the periphery of some large urban areas in the Northeast. 44 The data on small and
intermediate urban areas in close proximity to rural communities, in particular,
suggest an urban-rural interdependence that is supported by agglomeration
economies and economies of scale in the provision and use of regional services and
amenities.

42

Richard Florida, Some Rural Counties Are Seeing a Job Boom, Too: Economic Growth Is a
Mixed Bag in Urban and Rural Counties, Large and Small, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB, (Sept. 25,
2018) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-25/rural-counties-are-seeing-a-jobboom-too (reporting on job growth between 2001 and 2016).
43
William Frey, A 2020 Census Portrait of America’s Largest Metro Areas: Population Growth,
Diversity, Segregation, and Youth 1-31, UNLV BROOKINGS MOUNTAIN WEST (Apr. 21, 2022),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/A-2020-Census-Portrait-of-America_sLargest-Metro-Areas_-Populati.pdf; Kenneth Johnson, Rural America Lost Population Over the
Past Decade for the First Time in History, UNH CAREY SCH. PUB. POL’Y (Feb. 2022)
https://carsey.unh.edu/publication-rural-america-lost-population-over-past-decade-for-first-timein-history.
44
Id.
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A.

Positive Spillovers from Proximity

Urban and rural fortunes are more interdependent and connected than
conventional wisdom suggests. Early evidence based on the 2000-2010 census
noted that many of the fastest growing micropolitan areas — rural communities
with small urban centers – were located near fast-growing metropolitan areas. 45
Conversely, many of the micropolitan areas that were slow-growing or in decline
were located near slow-growing or declining major metropolitan areas. 46 One
indication that adjacent rural counties take advantage of strong urban economies is
reflected in evidence that a higher percentage of workers in growing rural counties
commute to nearby metropolitan or micropolitan areas. 47 A recent Brookings study
finds that rural counties adjacent to metropolitan areas suffered fewer job losses
between 2008 and 2017 than did non-adjacent rural counties, suggesting that
proximity to cities provides an economic buffer for nearby rural areas. 48 More
specifically, micropolitan areas rebounded to near-pre-recession employment
levels, performing even better than rural counties adjacent to metropolitan areas. 49
There are several ways that urban centers might generate positive spillovers
for proximate rural communities. 50 Our analysis of micropolitan areas in one
region of the country, the Southeast, suggests that rural counties located close to
small urban centers typically have better housing values and infrastructure
(specifically broadband) than rural counties not located in micropolitan areas.
Houses in rural southeastern counties that are not within a micropolitan area are far
lower than the average of their respective states (see Table 1).

Mackun & Wilson, supra note 33, at 4 (2011).
Id. at 5
47
See e.g. Amy Liu & Nathan Arnosti, The Best Way to Rejuvenate Rural America? Invest in
Cities, NY Times, April 13, 2019 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/opinion/rural-americacities.html
48
Arnosti & Liu, supra note 39.
49
Liu & Arnosti, supra note 47.
50
Arnosti & Liu, supra note 39
45
46
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Table 1: Housing Values in County in Same State
Single-Family
Home Single-Family Home Value in Overall SingleValue in Counties without Counties with Micropolitan Area Family
Home
Micropolitan
or Only
Value
Metropolitan Areas
Alabama
$95,689.35
$118,524.13
$132,847.48
Arkansas
$88,913.15
$97,578.42
$105,259.68
51
Florida
$151,783.19
$252,404.43
$262,161.19
Georgia
$132,178.79
$124,616.07
$164,594.40
Louisiana
$95,595.50
$137,704.00
$150,935.60
52
Mississippi
$103,491.75
$121,346.55
$121,296.75
North Carolina
$149,930.28
$189,767.32
$203,294.95
South Carolina
$96,756.64
$142,460.50
$171,260.90
Tennessee
$126,523.47
$168,157.29
$175,999.61
Source: Zillow (2021), United States Census Bureau (2019), United States Census
Bureau (2020)
State

Rural counties in the southeast without a micropolitan area significantly
underperform indicators of economic success relative to the national average (see
Table 2). These counties are exceedingly poor, with some more than double the
country’s average poverty rate. 53 The quality of online infrastructure in
southeastern counties that do not have a micropolitan area is abysmal. In many of
these counties, nearly forty percent of residents cannot access broadband internet,
more than double the percent of people that do not have access to broadband in the
country (see Table 2).

Distorted by Monroe County, which has a single-family home value of $798,000. Excluding
that county, the average price of a single-family home in rural Florida counties with a micropolitan
area is $161,423.
52
7 out of 27 counties of interest lacked housing data.
53
Counties that are impoverished are very likely to have relatively large Black populations.
51
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Table 2: Average Single-Family Home Values, Broadband Access, Poverty
Rate, and Black Percent of Population in Counties without Micropolitan or
Metropolitan Areas
State
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Louisiana
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina
Tennessee
National Average

Single-Family
Value
$95,689.35
$88,913.15
$151,783.19
$132,178.79
$95,595.50
$103,491.75
$149,930.28
$96,756.64
$126,523.47
$205,782.93

Home %
Population
with Broadband
61.99%
63.97%
69.46%
63.39%
59.17%
60.49%
67.84%
62.05%
67.33%
82.70%

Poverty
Rate (%)
21.67%
19.96%
19.86%
23.16%
26.63%
24.89%
18.99%
23.36%
19.82%
13.40%

Black % of
Population
33.35%
14.54%
16.82%
29.33%
32.39%
42.09%
21.83%
48.42%
5.17%
12.40%

In rural counties without a micropolitan area, a one percent increase in the
impoverished population decreases single-family home values by $4,560 (see
Regression 1). A one percent increase in the population that can access broadband
increases home values by nearly $3,200. There is a strong relationship between the
percentage of a county that is Black and the percentage that is impoverished, so a
one percent increase in the Black population is associated with a $1,200 reduction
in home values. The home values in rural counties that are not located in a
micropolitan area are substantially lower than rural counties that have micropolitan
areas.

10
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Regression 1: Determinants of Housing Value in Rural Communities without
Micropolitan Areas
(1)

(2)

(3)

VARIABLES

houseprice

houseprice

houseprice

Black

-1,201***
(154.9)

Poverty rate

-4,560***
(585.5)

Broadband

3,178***
(360.3)

Constant

146,342***

215,713***

-86,432***

(4,787)

(12,932)

(23,355)

Observations

229

229

229

R-squared

0.209

0.211

0.255

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Although proximity of rural counties to urban centers suggests positive
spillover effects, those effects have limits. Rural southern counties within a
micropolitan area fare slightly better than their more isolated counterparts, but still
underperform in terms of economic wellbeing relative to their states and the
national average. Counties with micropolitan areas in the southeast, on average,
have poverty rates that exceed the national average (see Table 3). Access to online
infrastructure is substandard in these counties but is superior to those of counties
without micropolitan areas. Primarily because of these improved conditions, home
values in these counties are higher than those of counties lacking micropolitan
areas, though they are still lower than values in non-rural parts of their states.
Nevertheless, more isolated rural counties are worse off than either urban centers
or rural counties located in close proximity to those centers.
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Table 3: Single-Family Home Values, Broadband Access, Poverty Rate, and
Black Percent of Population in Counties with Micropolitan Area
State
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Louisiana
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina
Tennessee
National Average
B.

Single-Family
Value
$118,524.13
$97,578.42
$252,404.43 54
$124,616.07
$137,704.00
$121,346.55
$189,767.32
$142,460.50 55
$168,157.29
$205,782.93

Home %
Population
with Broadband
71.35%
68.06%
68.46%
68.06%
68.01%
68.46%
72.15%
68.5%
71.44%
82.70%

Poverty
Rate (%)
20.06%
19.66%
21.07%
21.85%
23.96%
22.84%
18.62%
20.6%
17.31%
13.40%

Black % of
Population
24.03%
17.29%
11.26%
27.51%
29.27%
35.61%
20.09%
31.92%
6.28%
12.40%

Measuring Economic Strength in Micropolitan Regions

The above statistics are too general to extract any causal factors that might
be driving the differences in outcomes between rural counties in micropolitan
versus non-metropolitan regions. Nor do they give us a picture of the diversity of
micropolitan area economies and which factors contribute to positives spillovers
across urban and rural boundaries within those areas. Ross DeVol, formerly of the
Walton Family Foundation and currently of Heartland Forward, 56 has done some
of the most extensive research on micropolitan areas, highlighting their success and
ranking them according to performance-based metrics. 57 Focusing first on
micropolitan areas in the American “heartland” DeVol found that although that
region has experienced weaker growth than the East and West coasts since 2009,
several micropolitan areas outperform the nation and most micropolitan areas on
the Coasts. 58

Median is $165,067. Value is distorted by a county whose single-family home value is
$798,000.
55
Median is $117,854. Distorted by an outlying county whose single-family home value is
$327,000.
56
See Team - Ross Devol, HEARTLAND FORWARD (last accessed Sept. 11, 2022),
https://heartlandforward.org/team/ross-devol/.
57
Ross DeVol & Shelly J. Wisecarver, Micropolitan Success Stories From the Heartland,
WALTON FAM. FOUND. (2018); Devol & Crews, supra note 17.
58
Id. at 5.
54
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In DeVol’s analysis, five characteristics set economically successful
micropolitan areas in the heartland apart from their less successful counterparts.
They include: the presence of universities and research institutions; community
colleges and workforce development; support and capital for entrepreneurs;
strategic economic development planning; manufacturing and foreign direct
investment; growth in technology, scientific and other professional services; and
cultural, recreational and lifestyle amenities. In a later study, DeVol and his
colleagues rated the performance of micropolitan areas across the country and
ranked the most “dynamic” of them. 59 Among the top 5 micropolitan areas from
the latest DeVol report are those discussed earlier: Pecos, Texas; Findlay, Ohio;
Calhoun, Georgia; Heber, Utah; and Bozeman, Montana. Findlay, Ohio was the
only top-10 ranked micropolitan area in the heartland under DeVol’s metrics, and
is, notably, the only manufacturing-dependent micropolitan in that group. Other
top-20 micropolitan areas that were similarly dependent on manufacturing included
Calhoun (Georgia), discussed previously, and Lewisburg, Tennessee which takes
advantage of its location between Nashville (Tennessee) and Huntsville (Alabama).
Micropolitan areas mostly reliant on single source economies such as
agriculture and oil exploration that are vulnerable to negative economic shocks if
there is decline in their core industry or impacts from society-wide events such as
COVID. DeVol reports that Uvalde, Texas had survived the loss of a clothing
manufacturer by diversifying into industries such as fracking and big-game
hunting. 60 But the viability of fracking, which accounts for Uvalde’s dramatic job
growth between 2011 and 2016 depends on the boom/bust cycle of oil prices, so
that some leveling or even declines in job growth could threaten Uvalde’s economic
ascendence.
DeVol’s methodology is not the only one that could be used to evaluate
growth in micropolitan areas. DeVol focused on performance-based metrics such
as job growth, wage and income gains and the proportion of total jobs at young
firms. 61 Other methodologies generate very different rankings. Policomm
Coporation’s rankings of economic strength in metropolitan and micropolitan
areas, for example, are based on annual changes in a variety of factors that reflect
economic strength and economic weakness. 62 These include earnings within the
industrial, commercial, construction, and non-farming sectors, and (as a negative)

59

Id. at 6.
Id. at 32.
61
Id. at 14.
62
Policomm Corporation, 2022 Metropolitan Micropolitan Economic Strength Rankings,
available at https://policom.com/wp-content/uploads/2022-POLICOM-Economic-StrengthRankings.pdf.
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redistributive transfer payments and subsidies. 63 These different methodologies
generate very different rankings. For example, Pecos, Texas, the most dynamic
micropolitan area by DeVol’s methodology, places between 172 and 312 of 543
micropolitan areas according to Policomm’s rankings. 64
C.

Regional Amenities and Micropolitan Growth

Differences in methodology do not belie the importance of specific
elements that tend to enhance the economic success of micropolitan areas, even if
they are imperfect predictors of short-term success. A majority of the most
dynamic areas, DeVol’s report found, were driven by some combination of tourism,
recreation and the presence of arts, cultural, recreational and lifestyle amenities. 65
These amenities seem important to attracting the talent base that attracts firms.
The role of amenities is a striking factor in understanding the growth and
success of some micropolitan areas. An important strain of the literature on urban
agglomeration economies has been to highlight the link between amenities and the
growth of cities and metropolitan regions. 66 Edward Glaeser’s work, in particular,
has focused on the existence of consumption amenities—theaters, museums,
restaurants, etc.—in resurgent metropolitan areas that had attracted large numbers
of high-income and high-skilled individuals relative to cities or regions that had
either stable or declining populations. 67 For example, investing in regional
amenities became a crucial part of the strategy of Pittsburgh, which halted what
might have been an inevitable decline after the steel industry collapse in the 1980s,
by investing in regional scale arts institutions and sports venues and transforming
its old industrial area into an entertainment and shopping destination. 68
Similarly, as mentioned, cultural, recreational, and lifestyle amenities seem
to be important to micropolitan areas for the same reasons they are important to
thriving metropolitan regions. 69 Given the relationship between amenities and
Id. at 4-7.
See DeVol & Crews, supra note 17, at 6; Policomm, supra note 62, at 16.
65
Another study found that amenity-rich areas also tend to vote evenly divided between
Republicans and Democrats. Jessica D. Ulrich-Schad & Cynthia M. Duncan, People and Places
Left Behind: Work, Culture and Politics in the Rural United States, 45 J. PEASANT STUD. 59, 6162, 70 (2018).
66
Terry Nichols Clark et al., Amenities Drive Urban Growth, 24 J. URB. AFF. 493 (2002); Jordan
Rappaport, Consumption Amenities and City Population Density, 38 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON.
553 (2008).
67
Edward Glaeser et al., The Consumer City, 1 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 27, 33-34 (2001).
68
Scott Andes, Mitch Horowitz, Ryan Helwig, and Bruce Katz, Capturing the Next Economy:
Pittsburgh’s Rise as a Global Innovation Center, BROOKINGS INST., September 2017 at 21.
69
DeVol & Crews, supra note 17, at 10.
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growth, it is no surprise that a diverse range of cities –such as Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma; Camden, New Jersey; and San Antonio, Texas —“have leveraged
public and private investments in leisure spaces and beautification to spur
demographic change and economic development.” 70
The downside of an amenities-based approach to regional development
involves the congestion costs that accompany very high amenity areas. Higher
housing prices are likely to result in areas with supply inelastic housing markets,
which could create issues of affordability for less wealthy rural residents.71
Investing in lifestyle and consumption amenities to attract the high-skilled
populations, and the companies expected to follow them, presumes a strong job
multiplier effect for non-skilled populations. To the extent that this strong
multiplier effect requires a cluster of high-tech companies, the risks of such a
strategy might outweigh the benefits. On the other hand, the strong positive
relationships between urban growth and the presence of amenities does not seem to
depend on the attraction of a particular type of firm and may still catalyze
agglomeration economies through the attraction of new migrants, including remote
workers. Those migrants could result in a multiplier effect by spurring the creation
of a robust service economy and job growth for lesser skilled workers.
D.

Interregional Migration Dynamics

Micropolitan areas will likely be important to interregional migration in a
post-COVID world. While historically most migration in the United State is
intraregional, with the majority of moves occurring within the same county or state,
a significant portion of the population moves between regions. 72 As the DeVol
reports underscore, regional competition for domestic migrants likely depends on
the presence of regional amenities, the clustering of industry and research or
knowledge institutions, and other attractive aspects of a dynamic regional
ecosystem. One might object that agglomeration benefits are too limited in
geographical scope to be relevant regionwide. After all, Rosenthal and Strange
conclude that spillover effects shrink by roughly half after five miles, and the
effects are notably smaller even after one mile. 73 But even if those effects constrict
the incentives for firms to locate anywhere within a region, the same does not
Gerald A. Carlino & Albert Saiz, Beautiful City: Leisure Amenities and Urban Growth, 59 J.
REG’L SCI. 369 (2019).
71
Id.
72
Nestor M. Davidson & Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Case for Regionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 70 (2013).
73
See, e.g., Stuart S. Rosenthal and William C. Strange, How Close Is Close? The Spatial Reach
of Agglomeration Economies, 34 J. ECON. PERSPS., no. 1, 27, 39 (2020).
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necessarily hold true for those firms’ employees, and the investment of those
employees’ income in their local communities can have positive effects for
individual regional communities. Moreover, mobile employees in one jurisdiction
within a region can still take advantage of amenities situated in other jurisdictions
within the same region. As a result, at least individual location decisions are likely
to be the result of the aggregation of regional characteristics, and not just those of
any given constituent part of the region. 74
While regional amenities and assets can be a pull factor for migration
between regions, it is also becoming clear that the COVID pandemic was a push
factor. According to a recent Brookings analysis, during the first year of the
pandemic, the nation’s 56 major metropolitan areas experienced a significant outmigration and an “absolute decline” in their size while smaller metropolitan areas
experienced higher population growth than the previous two years. 75 Non-metro
areas experienced the greatest annual population gain in more than a decade
representing a significant population shift to smaller-sized places at least during
2020-2021. 76
Whether these patterns hold as we emerge from the pandemic is an open
question. 77 If they do, rural areas within commuting distance to major cities and
metropolitan areas, including by plane, should benefit economically. A 2018
Headwaters Economics study of western states found that “connected” rural
counties – those within a one-hour drive of major airports with daily passenger
services to larger labor markets in metro counties– frequently outperform “isolated”
rural counties. 78 Connected counties more closely resembled metropolitan
counties, with high growth rates, a greater proportion of the population under 21,
an educated workforce, and employment in services and the professional sector, as
well as manufacturing. 79 Isolated counties, in contrast, had relatively low rates of
education, slow growth rates, and the highest percentages of population over 65
and share of income from non-labor sources (e.g., more retirees).
Davidson & Foster, supra note 72, at 86-88.
William H. Frey, New Census Data Shows a Huge Spike in Movement out of Big Metro Areas
During The Pandemic, BROOKINGS INST. (April 14, 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/theavenue/2022/04/14/new-census-data-shows-a-huge-spike-in-movement-out-of-big-metro-areasduring-the-pandemic/.
76
Id. (coastal areas, industrial Midwest, and parts of the South had losses, while Sun Belt areas
had population gains).
77
See Steven Kurutz, New Yorkers Who Fled the Virus Are Returning Home, Warily, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2021.
78
Ray Rasker et al., The Economic Importance of Air Travel in High-Amenity Rural Areas, 25 J.
RURAL STUD. 343 (2009).
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Id. at 15-19.
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The specter of increased mobility of metropolitan residents to nonmetropolitan areas, and specifically to growing or dynamic micropolitan areas,
potentially helps to bridge the urban/rural divide through targeted policies and
economic investments. Some of these movers are assessing and responding to
regional-scale amenities, infrastructure, and public goods – including the regulatory
environment and tax burden– that will likely require targeted investments and
subsidies to the urban centers and cities most likely to give rise to positive
spillovers. Targeted investment and subsidies might also be necessary to foster
network externalities in the region, linking cities and towns with rural counties
through transportation and telecommunication infrastructures. In the next section,
we reflect on some of these policy and investment interventions.
III. Reducing the Economic Divide
A. Aligning Causes and Remedies.
The evidence that rural parts of micropolitan areas do better than their
counterparts outside of micropolitan areas does not imply a specific policy
intervention. The success of any such intervention depends heavily on its
relationship to the cause and character of the economic divide. If regional
economic strength is concentrated in the principal city (rather than dispersed across
the region) then reducing the divide entails attracting rural residents and
entrepreneurs into the principal city so they can participate in the agglomeration
benefits to which enhanced urban productivity is attributed. That seems to be
reflected in the success of micropolitan areas such as Lewisburg, the success of
which appears to be based on its ability to entice manufacturers that can take
advantage of the regional workforce. In doing so, Lewisburg markets itself as part
of Marshall County and its surrounding counties. 80
In that case, and
counterintuitively, it is plausible that the best way to assist rural residents within
micropolitan areas as a general matter would be to assist their principal cities, since
economic growth within cities would generate spillover benefits in outlying areas.
Relatedly, appropriate interventions will also depend on the specific drivers
of the principal city’s economy. To the extent that those drivers depend on skill
sets that are not shared by rural residents, additional aid to principal cities will not
necessarily benefit rural residents. Instead, it will be more useful to provide rural
residents with the skill sets that match employer needs within the city and thus
generate agglomeration benefits, or to develop entrepreneurial activities within the
rural areas to enjoy knowledge spillovers from urban firms. If, for example,
See LEWISBURG, TENNESSEE GOVERNMENT, https://lewisburgtn.gov/ (last accessed Sept. 12,
2022).
80
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successful principal city economies rest on attracting firms that depend on
information technology, and if rural residents have neither training in nor access to
high-quality technology, then they are less likely to be able to participate in the
principal city’s growth. It is not coincidental that DeVol found that the presence of
community colleges and workforce development was correlated with successful
micropolitan areas. Of course, if the drivers of rural economic growth include
features that are not characteristic of cities, then rural parts of micropolitan areas
may develop independently of their cities, and may even confer spillover benefits
on those cities. For example, advances in areas that exploit technological advances
in hydraulic fracturing, such as Pecos, Texas, may not occupy much space in the
downtown areas of the principal city within the region. Nevertheless, rural
deployment of that technology could generate rural growth and attract workers from
the entire region.
Interventions that fail to address the causes of the urban/rural divide waste
the opportunity for small-to medium-sized cities to generate some of the
agglomeration benefits associated with large cities and the corresponding conferral
of benefits on rural residents in micropolitan areas. Firms within relatively small
cities may generate employment opportunities that carry a wage premium and may
have employment needs that cannot be satisfied by city residents alone. That
scenario produces opportunities for rural residents to earn the wage premium
associated with city work and thus raise the economic status of rural areas.
The possibility of such benefits is apparent in research that concludes that
micropolitan areas share some of the urban wage premium that exists in
metropolitan areas, i.e., that workers in cities, either large or small, earn higher
average wages than workers outside those areas. 81 But that same literature indicates
that the nature of the firms that locate within the micropolitan area may matter for
purposes of rural economic growth. Shutters and Applegate, for example, conclude
that the micropolitan wage premium is smaller than that in metropolitan areas, as
would be expected if wages scale with city size. But they also find that the wage
premium in micropolitan areas is diminishing, and has been for several years. That
finding suggests that simply providing jobs in denser parts of micropolitan areas
will not necessarily enhance the related rural areas. Instead, enhancing rural wealth
may require a more highly tailored approach to urban growth.
Shutters and Applegate suggest, for example, that the diminished wage
premium may reflect increased economic complexity that demands more highly
skilled, professional workers, a characteristic that large cities can accommodate
See Shade T. Shutters & J. M. Applegate, The Urban Wage Premium is Disappearing in U.S.
Micropolitan Areas, 17 PLOS ONE 0267210 (2022),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0267210.
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better than micropolitan areas. 82 If a micropolitan area attracts high-wage firms
that employ a significant percentage of the area’s workforce, then the entire area
realizes benefits. 83 Those benefits may reflect the greater educational opportunities
in large cities that allow workers to attain and deploy skills in innovative industries
that pay better, or the advantages that large cities, and their workers, enjoy from a
globalized economy. 84 But other micropolitan areas, Shutters and Applegate
suggest, insufficiently integrate rural residents into the urban economy and thus
simply reflect the same economic divide that characterizes the urban/rural divisions
that exist outside of micropolitan areas.
B. Urban Aid to Rural Residents.
The positive effects of principal city growth on rural neighbors can only be
realized if rural residents have physical access to and the skill sets necessary for the
relevant jobs. Attracting firms that provide high-wage jobs and exploiting the urban
advantage in training and education depend significantly on investments in basic
infrastructure such as transportation and communication facilities that allow
physical access to jobs and the skills necessary to perform them. Infrastructure
enhancements within the city itself may be sufficient if the city desires to attract
and employ only residents. But relatively small cities may need to attract firms and
to expand the employment base beyond principal city boundaries. If that is the case,
then the principal city can benefit from supporting infrastructure enhancements that
facilitate commutes to the city for purposes of training, education, or employment.
Road improvements and transportation systems (e.g., much maligned, but arguably
remediable jitney services) that reduce commuting time from outlying jurisdictions
may thus be appropriate expenditures for cities, notwithstanding that the physical
improvements they underwrite occur outside city boundaries.
If, however, rural residents neither contribute to nor are necessary for the
economic growth of the principal city, then interlocal interventions to address the
urban/rural divide may be more complicated. Enhancing rural wealth would then
depend on principal city investments that would expand to neighboring areas the
technology and training associated with the urban wage premium. Those
enhancements would arguably generate benefits both by making technology-based
employment in the city more accessible to rural residents, but also by fostering
Id. at 5-6.
Andrew W. Hait, Change in Micropolitan Area Businesses Varies Widely by Economic Sector,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (October 12, 2021),
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/10/number-of-businesses-grow-in-metros-shrink-inmicros.html.
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employment opportunities within rural areas. There is some evidence, for example,
that broadband availability in rural areas during the pandemic had a positive and
significant effect on rural employment. 85 That conclusion is consistent with
findings that there is a particularly strong positive relationship between broadband
availability and economic growth in low-density areas. 86 The resulting growth
could be due to greater availability of high wage urban jobs to rural dwellers who
have access to and can obtain training in high-paying jobs. Or it could be that rural
dwellers who obtain the relevant technological skills develop rural businesses that
create additional employment opportunities for less-skilled rural dwellers. A small
rural manufacturing or food provision business that grows with access to
technology, for example, still needs truck drivers to deliver its product to its
expanded market. Indeed, it is plausible that the relationship between broadband
availability and economic growth would be strongest within micropolitan areas.
While the availability of broadband has positive effects on new firm location in
rural areas generally, that effect is largest in more populated rural areas and in areas
that are adjacent to metropolitan areas. 87 Again, since the latter result suggests that
the positive effect increases with agglomeration economies, one would anticipate
that investments in broadband and other infrastructure would have greater effects
in rural areas within micropolitan areas than in more isolate rural areas.
The prospect of such investment implies that principal cities in micropolitan
areas should subsidize their outlying rural areas. While the claim for intraregional
distribution is by no means novel, redistribution from city to its neighbors may be.
When cities were relatively depressed relative to their outlying jurisdictions, it was
common in the academic urban literature to ask whether the interdependence of
cities and their surrounding areas warranted suburban subsidies of the city
economy. 88 As urban life has become more financially secure, perhaps the relevant
question is, Should cities help their counties? The initial claims of suburban aid to
cities were often based as much on the economic interdependence of localities
within a region as on claims of equity. 89 Interdependence meant that redistribution
ultimately redounded to the benefit of the paying locality as well as to the recipient.
But if that is the case, then micropolitan areas may similarly benefit from
redistribution from the principal city outward.
Catherine Isley and Sarah A. Low, Broadband Adoption and Availability: Impacts on Rural
Employment During COVID-19, 46 TELECOMM. POL. 1 (2022).
86
Jed Kolko, Broadband and Local Growth, 71 J. URB. ECON. 100 (2012).
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Younjun Kim & Peter F. Orazem, Broadband Internet and New Firm Location Decisions in
Rural Areas, 99 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1 (2017).
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See Andrew F. Haughwout & Robert P. Inman, Should Suburbs Help Their Central City?, 2002
BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFFAIRS 45.
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Return, for example, to the data cited above that suggests proximity to an
airport increases the economic performance of a rural county. Infrastructure
improvements that connect rural parts of micropolitan areas to denser areas, in
short, may permit the former to participate in the agglomeration benefits of the
latter. But those benefits begin with the capacity of rural residents to obtain the
training necessary to produce the goods and service that can be delivered elsewhere
through improved transportation networks. Principal cities and their resident firms,
where the training will be utilized, may provide the best source of personnel capable
of performing the training necessary for rural resident economic improvements.
One could imagine, for example, principal city residents providing both personnel
and capital to support technical courses in rural-based community colleges.
The argument for principal city subsidies is complicated by the prospective
growth of remote work. If firms are willing to abandon some of the agglomeration
benefits associated with office work, then rural areas may gain economic advantage
insofar as residents could earn a wage premium associated with urban work (albeit
reduced by the potentially lower productivity associated with remote work 90)
without abandoning their preference for the amenities of rural living. Under those
circumstances, however, it is more difficult to justify urban subsidies of the
necessary rural infrastructure. Funding for rural infrastructure would still be
justified at the state or federal level simply as a matter of attaining regional
economic growth or as a redistributive matter. But if the principal city within the
micropolitan area gains no special benefit from rural improvements, then the
argument for interlocal subsidies within the micropolitan area is weaker.
The road to economic improvement of rural areas, therefore, may depend
on the kinds and location of jobs the principal city makes available. If, for example,
resurgence of the principal city depends on training for manufacturing or
commercial enterprises that rural residents already possess or can attain at low cost,
then enhancing city growth implies tying rural residents more closely to the
principal city. If one considers the micropolitan areas that DeVol studied, for
example, creating more significant financial ties among jurisdictions in the Findlay,
Ohio area, which depends on manufacturing, or the Heber, Utah area, which
depends on tourism, may be more appropriate than in areas that host clusters of
professional, scientific and technical services, except to the extent that investments
See, e.g., Ting Zhang, Dan Gerlowski & Zoltan Acs, Working From Home: Small Business
Performance and the COVID-19 Pandemic, 58 SMALL BUS. ECON. 611, 626-27 (2022); Natalia
Emanuel & Emma Harrington, “Working” Remotely? Selection, Treatment, and the Market
Provision of Remote Work (Harvard Dept. of Econ., Working Paper, April 2021), available at
https://scholar.harvard.edu/eharrington/publications/working-remotely-selection-treatment-andmarket-provision-remote-work; Nicholas A. Bloom et al., Does Working from Home Work?
Evidence from a Chinese Experiment, 130 Q. J. ECON. 165 (2015).
90
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in infrastructure attract workers who can support the retail, hospitality, or supply
chain economies on which the principal city’s industries rely to attract their own
workers.
Again, our claim is not that rural areas should eschew investments in
training or infrastructure that the data suggest enhance economic prosperity. The
only claim we have made is that the self-interest of the principal city in the
micropolitan area should create incentives for interlocal subsidies to achieve those
goals where principal city and micropolitan development depends on attracting
rural residents into the urban workforce or creating rural jobs that provide positive
spillovers to the city.
C. Can City Subsidies of Rural Areas be Effective?
Local subsidies are frequently seen as inefficient expenditures, at least in
the context of localities attempting to attract firms with targeted subsidies. Those
efforts often founder on a failure to determine that the specific subsidy is both
necessary and effective in attracting a firm and the dubious economic benefits
associated with doing so. Instead, cities often appear to bid for firms without much
attention to whether attracting the targeted firm will produce tax revenues in excess
of the subsidies offered. 91 Much of the literature on local economic development
suggests that cities consistently overinvest in targeting specific firms and that
targeting fails to correspond to the characteristics on which firms make their
locational decisions. 92 Both anecdotal evidence and more methodical studies reveal
that cities frequently provide targeted firms with subsidies that are never recovered,
that at best fail to increase economic activity, or subsidize the locational decision
that would otherwise have been made, 93 and that at worst leave the host with
See, e.g., David McCabe, Visions of a U.S. Computer Chip Boom Have Cities Hustling, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 17, 2019. Articles on tax expenditures. Nathan M. Jensen, Five economic
development takeaways from the Amazon HQ2 bids, Brookings Institution (March 4, 2019),
available at https://www.brookings.edu/research/five-economic-development-takeaways-from-theamazon-hq2-bids/.
92
See, e.g., David McCabe, Visions of a U.S. Computer Chip Boom Have Cities Hustling, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2019; Nathan M. Jensen, Five Economic Development Takeaways From the
Amazon HQ2 Bids, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 4, 2019), available at
https://www.brookings.edu/research/five-economic-development-takeaways-from-the-amazonhq2bids/.https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/&httpsre
dir=1&article=1228&context=reports.
93
See, e.g., Cailin Slattery & Owen Zidar, Evaluating State and Local Business Incentives, 34 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 90 (2020), Timothy Bartik, “But For” Percentages for Economic Development
Incentives: What Percentage Estimates Are Plausible Based on the Research Literature? (July 31,
2018) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227086 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3227086.
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substantial debt overhang that interferes with attracting potentially more productive
investments. 94
In addition, even where municipalities subsidize firms, the spillover effects
to the region are debatable. Slattery and Zidar, for example, conclude from a study
of state and local business tax incentives that include state corporate taxes, state tax
credits, and firm-specific incentives that there is no strong evidence that firmspecific tax incentives increase broader economic growth at the state and local
level. 95 Indeed, given the plausible argument that successful local subsidies will
cause increases in a region’s land, public goods, and commodity prices as a result
of increased demand, subsidies may result in negative externalities for other
locations. 96
While we accept the critique of local subsidies to targeted firms, it is less
clear that these lessons translate to efforts to subsidize particular projects that would
benefit rural areas. Urbanists who oppose targeted subsidies often recommend that
cities that seek economic development instead make generalized investments in
infrastructure and job training that are amenable to different industries than in
attempting to target a particular firm or cluster. The subsidies that we recommend
in the form of training, communication, and transportation are more akin to those
generalized investments than to investments in attracting targeted firms. Certainly
the inevitable politics that will infect any principal city efforts to assist fewer than
all of the jurisdictions within the micropolitan area, could interfere with the
selection of a project that has the greatest regional benefit as opposed to the project
that returns the greatest political return for principal city officials. And it is even
plausible that the city subsidizes a project that benefits one jurisdiction within the
area, but imposes net costs on another. Thus our hopeful but tentative conclusion,
based largely on the self-interest of principal cities in exploiting the economic
interdependency of localities within a micropolitan area, is that urban subsidies of
infrastructure and job development in rural area have the potential to promote
agglomeration benefits for micropolitan regions as a whole.

See, e.g., LAWRENCE TABAK, FOXCONNED: IMAGINARY JOBS, BULLDOZED HOMES, AND THE
SACKING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2021); Matt Bai, Thrown for a Curve in Rhode Island, N.Y.
Times, April 20, 2013, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/business/curt-schillingrhode-island-and-the-fall-of-38-studios.html.
95
Slattery & Zidar, supra note 93.
96
See Roger H. Gordon, An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism, 98 Q. J. ECON. 567
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IV. Reducing Political Polarization: Social Contact Theory and Its Limits
Our objective to this point has been to explore the means by which
micropolitan regions attain economic success. As we indicated at the outset,
however, investing in the mechanisms that promote economic growth could
generate an additional positive effect by reducing the political polarization that
characterizes the urban/rural divide. The basis for that suggestion lies in social
contact theory. That theory suggests that physical interactions among otherwise
disparate groups reduces animosity and prejudice that otherwise effect relations
among those groups.
At least some of the relevant literature finds that the lack of interaction
between urban and rural residents accounts for a significant amount of the partisan
divide. Gimpel and his co-authors, for example, find that urban/rural political
differences remain even after controlling for characteristics related to why people
choose urban or rural residence such as education, income, age, or race. 97 They
hypothesize that the explanation lies in the social context in which individuals
“share their likes and dislikes, values, and beliefs.” 98 That hypothesis transcends
explanations that individuals with similar views migrate to the same location and
adds a mechanism for explaining similarities in attitudes, i.e., repeat interactions
with like-minded individuals who have selected the same place of residence
reinforces the beliefs of that group. 99 The hypothesis, therefore, is consistent with
findings that geographical context, even at the neighborhood level, has a socializing
influence on voters. 100
But if the absence of interactions between individuals of diverse views
explains political polarization, then the presence of interactions may dilute that
same divide. The argument that social contact can have positive attitudinal effects
and neutralize prejudice dates at least as far back at Gordon Allport’s study of racial
prejudice, 101 and has subsequently been used to explain reduction in prejudice
beyond characteristics of race and ethnicity, including attitudes towards
homosexuals, the disabled and the mentally ill. 102 The mechanism for the
Gimpel et al., supra note 8.
Id. at 1364.
99
See, e.g., Daniel DellaPosta, Yongren Shi, & Michael Macy, Why Do Liberals Drink Lattes?,
120 A.J. SOC. 1473 (2015).
100
Wendy K. Tam Cho, Residential Concentration, Political Socialization, and Voter Turnout, 68
J. POL. 156 (2006).
101
See Gordon Allport, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954); Gordon Allport & B.M. Kramer, Some
Roots of Prejudice, 22 J. PSYCH. 9 (1946).
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See, e.g., Thomas F. Pettigrew et al., Recent Advances in Intergroup Contact Theory, 35 INT’L
J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 271 (2011); Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test
of Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 751 (2006).
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phenomenon may be little more than exposing individuals to the other’s attitudes,
preferences, and reasoning. The result may not be conversion of one group to the
other’s perspective, but at least appreciation of the reasonableness of each other’s
position so that different perspectives become alternatives rather than demonized
ideological positions.
This is not to say that intergroup contact alone will dilute hostility. Indeed,
one could imagine circumstances under which contact could exacerbate hostility,
such as where groups occupy different levels of a hierarchical relationship. Allport,
for example, suggested that the success of intergroup contact may depend on
characteristics such as equal group status within the situation, commonality of
goals, cooperation, and external support for the effort. 103 In addition, the optimistic
view of intergroup contact may be distorted by the absence of highly prejudiced
people who avoid intergroup contact, and the “success” of intergroup contact may
be influenced by the processes of interaction. 104 Indeed, several studies have
concluded that the optimistic predictions for social contact theory are not warranted
given the current state of knowledge. 105
Nevertheless, we speculate that social contact theory provides some reason
for optimism that the polarizing attitudes reflected in the urban/rural divide could
dissipate as economic relations between jurisdictions in micropolitan areas
advance. But even if social contact dilutes polarization, its effects may be minimal
if political attitudes of principal city residents and rural residents within
micropolitan areas do not significantly diverge, perhaps because the demographic
and ethnic characteristics that correlate with political attitudes are relatively similar
for the two groups. In the 2020 presidential election, for example, voters in the
Belknap County, New Hampshire micropolitan area cast 54.4% of their votes for
Trump and 44% for Biden. In the county’s principal city of Laconia, the
percentages were nearly identical, 52% for Trump and 46.4% for Biden. The
Census Bureau reports that Laconia is 95.5% White, with 90.8% graduates of high
school or higher, and a median household income of $55,814. Grafton County is
similarly 96.3% White, 92.8% rate of high school or greater education, though a
median household income of $67,328. The city/rural political divide appears to
have been virtually non-existent. Indianola, Mississippi, a majority Black city
within majority Black Sunflower County, similarly cast votes in percentages that

See, e.g., Thomas F. Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact Theory, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 65 (1998).
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revealed little difference in the political preferences of city and county residents.106
Other micropolitan areas, however, do appear to exhibit polarization.
Pullman, Washington, for example cast 23.6 % of its votes for Trump in the 2020
election, while Whitman County, in which the city sits, cast 42.9% of its votes for
Trump. Pullman is 74.8% White and 12.2% Asian. Median household income is
$32,073 and 96.9% of residents 25 years of age or older have at least high school
degrees. Whitman County as a whole comprises a population that is 83.8% White
and 8.4% Asian, with a median household income of $42,288 and 95.6% of the
population 25 years of age or older have at least high school degrees. Voters in
Lebanon, New Hampshire cast 24.6 % of its votes for Trump while surrounding
Grafton County voters cast 36.9% of its votes for Trump. If social contact is
effective in reducing political polarization, there appear to be a substantial number
of micropolitan areas in which its benefits could be realized.
Even if social contact does not reduce political polarization, it may be
relevant to our concern about economic polarization. In an important recent study,
Raj Chetty and his colleagues performed a massive study on 21 billion Facebook
friendships to evaluate the relationship between the scope of social networks and
upward mobility. 107 They find that children in counties with greater economic
connectedness, defined as having a relatively high share of upper-income friends
among lower-income people, enjoy higher levels of upward income mobility.
Economic connectedness appears to be significant in promoting upward income
mobility while other measures of social capital or civic engagement do not.108
While increasing connectedness between urban and micropolitan areas does not
translate into sharing the same neighborhood, the resulting exposure between urban
and rural residents could still generate the social connections that Chetty and his
colleagues find conducive to greater economic success. Indeed, promoting
workplace connections between urban and micropolitan residents may produce
even more significant levels of upward income mobility, since the study finds that
“friending bias” – the tendency to create friendships with people of one’s own class
– is less prevalent in workplaces than in other social settings. 109

Trump received 23.8% of votes in Indianola and 28.9% of votes in the county.
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V. Obstacles to Intraregional Redistribution
Our argument to this point has been that rural counties within micropolitan
areas are better off economically than their counterparts outside of metropolitan or
micropolitan areas. We have also noted that the relationship between the principal
city within a micropolitan area and its rural neighbors is interdependent. That
relationship presents a puzzle: if relatively well-off cities can benefit from
expanding economic opportunity to qualified nonresidents, why don’t selfinterested cities invest more frequently in the infrastructure and programs that
would subsidize rural neighbors? As an empirical matter, it may be that some such
investments do occur, and it would be valuable to determine whether those
micropolitan areas that are most successful experience subsidies of the type we
recommend. We have not made that inquiry, but speculate that across micropolitan
areas generally, a suboptimal amount of subsidy (perhaps approaching zero) occurs.
In this section, we posit three explanations for the absence of redistributive
investments from principal cities to rural neighbors. The first involves transactions
costs, the costs of identifying a city’s “fair share” of intraregional investments and
of bargaining about the allocation of that share among multiple affected
jurisdictions. The second involves the reluctance of members of the subsidizing
jurisdiction to redistribute to groups with which they feel limited affinity. The third
involves legal default rules that frequently frustrate interlocal cooperation.
Consider first the transactions costs involved in making intraregional
transfers. A principal city within a micropolitan area that desires to enhance
opportunities for rural neighbors must first determine how much to invest, a
calculation that is likely related to the marginal benefits that the city is likely to
obtain from redistributive expenditures. That exercise requires determining the
costs that commuters impose on the central city and comparing those costs to the
benefits that the same commuters confer on the city. Such calculations are fraught
with difficulties over what counts as a cost and a benefit, as well as the value to
affix to each. 110 Even a city that calculates an appropriate subsidy must then decide
how to allocate that subsidy within the region and deal with the risk that investment
renders the city vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by the recipient localities.111
See, e.g., Howard Chernick and Olesya Tkacheva, The Commuter Tax and the Fiscal Cost of
Commuters to New York City, 25 STATE TAX NOTES 451 (2002); Martin Shields and David
Shidler, Do Commuters Free-Ride? Estimating the Impacts of Interjurisdictional Commuting on
Local Public Goods Expenditures, 33 J. REG’L ANALYSIS & POL. 27,40-41 (2003); Brett W.
Hawkins and Douglas M. Ihrke, Reexamining the Suburban Exploitation Thesis in American
Metropolitan Areas, 29 PUBLIUS 109, 110 (1999).
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If the rural area comprises multiple smaller jurisdictions (towns, villages), then city
efforts to locate the optimal partner for investments in infrastructure such as
training facilities, roads, or broadband are likely to involve costly multi-party
bargaining, replete with local disputes about the desirability of any particular area
being selected, or not, as the situs of proposed improvements. Additionally, once
subsidies are granted, the principal city will likely desire to ensure that expenditures
are dedicated to activities likely to generate the spillovers that motivated the city
subsidy in the first instance and that the rural jurisdiction would not otherwise fund
on its own. Attempting to identify the appropriate expenditures and then to monitor
their use may prove too costly and uncertain to justify the subsidy in the first
instance. 112
The need to allocate and to monitor subsidies reveals a second obstacle to
intraregional subsidies – the very socio-economic heterogeneity of urban areas and
their rural neighbors that drives the divide. There is a significant literature that
suggests the willingness of individuals to redistribute wealth varies with the affinity
that payors feel to payees. Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote suggest that racial
discrimination and negative attitudes towards the poor partially explain lower levels
of redistribution in the United States than in European countries. 113 Other studies
by Alesina reinforce these unhappy conclusions. Alesina and La Ferrara found that
participation in community or government groups declined with ethnic or economic
heterogeneity. 114 And Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly show that expenditures on local
public goods such as education, trash pickup, roads, and sewers are lower in racially
diverse communities. 115 These effects are also reflected in annexation rates.
Clingermeyer and Feiock, for example, found some, but limited evidence that
annexation efforts are less successful when the effect would be to increase the
minority population of the annexing city. 116 They also conclude that substantial
poverty rates in either the annexing or annexed area reduced the rate of annexation
success. 117 And there is significant evidence of the phenomenon of municipal
“underbounding,” or the exclusion of Black or poor communities from areas
proposed for annexation. 118 As Alesina and Giuliano unhappily conclude: “A large
See Clayton P. Gillette, The Conditions of Interlocal Cooperation, 21 J.L. & POL. 365, 377-79
(2005).
113
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114
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ECON. 847 (2000).
115
Alberto Alesina, et al., Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions, 114 Q.J. ECON. 1243 (1999).
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body of experimental and statistical evidence shows that altruism travels less across
racial and ethnic lines. In fact, as it turns out, this is an extremely important
determinant of preferences for redistribution. When the poor are disproportionately
concentrated in a racial minority, the majority, coeteris paribus, prefer less
redistribution.” 119 The underlying cause may not be active animosity towards other
groups as opposed to a preference for generosity towards similar groups. But the
effect may be that incentives to assist others decline as those needing assistance
differ along ethnic or socio-economic dimensions from those in a position to offer
assistance. One might expect that self-interest would lead those who can offer
assistance to do so, where redistribution can redound to the benefit of the grantor
as well as the grantee. But we do not find anything in the literature that suggests
such an effect, and the common observation that suburbanites failed to assist their
central cities notwithstanding substantial evidence that suburban and central city
fortunes are interdependent seems to count against it.
The third obstacle to intraregional redistribution involves the default rules
of local government law. Legal scholars typically attribute interlocal disparities in
the provision of local services including housing, education, and policing to legal
default rules that permit localities autonomously to regulate zoning, resist
annexation, allocate expenditures, and set tax rates without regard for the external
effects of local decisions or the resources available to other localities. 120 The
limited constitutional protection for wealth-based classifications reduces mandates
of interlocal equalization to those that can muster a political majority at the state
legislative level and those that can find support in discrete state constitutional
clauses. 121 In short, urban areas may not assist their rural neighbors because they
don’t have to.
That is not to say that regional provision or regional government would
necessarily be a superior means of organizing regions, notwithstanding that
regionalism might ameliorate some of the drawbacks of local autonomy. A variety
Texas' Lower Rio Grande Valley, 46 ENV. & PLAN. 1699 (2014); Daniel T. Lichter et. al.,
Municipal Underbounding: Annexation and Racial Exclusion in Small Southern Towns, 72 RURAL
SOC. 47 (2007).
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120
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Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest,
and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO.
L.J. 1985 (2000).
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San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), held that wealth
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Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. 477 (2013).
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of autonomous localities within a region may induce competition for more efficient
service delivery, permit more satisfaction of individual preferences for local public
goods (not all of which, after all, are invidious), 122 and allow closer relationships
between local officials and constituents that promote civic participation and
monitoring by citizens. 123 Thus, it is not only the case that regionalization, whether
it means formal interlocal cooperation or the replacing of local governments with
more centralized entities, faces strong political headwinds, it is also the case that
regionalization poses its own difficulties.
Nevertheless, there exist a significant number of redistributive interlocal
cooperative arrangements that have overcome the obstacles we have discussed.
These agreements provide for transfer payments rather than simply cooperative
agreements among jurisdictions to realize efficiencies in the delivery of services. 124
Successful redistributive agreements share some characteristics. There is some
evidence that cities with Democratic majorities are more willing to enter
redistributive agreements with their neighbors. 125 But that same evidence indicates
that redistributive agreements are more likely where the recipient jurisdiction is
also majority-Democrat. 126 Thus, those findings also support the thesis that
redistributive agreements are less likely where the donor and recipient jurisdictions
are heterogeneous, at least where heterogeneity is defined by political leanings.
Other characteristics of interlocal redistribution provide some support for the
proposition that micropolitan areas could successfully deploy such agreements. For
example, city officials are likely to endorse a redistributive program only when that
is consistent with residents’ preferences, and the variation among those preferences
is likely to be greater in the large cities that characterize metropolitan areas than in
the smaller cities representative of micropolitan areas. 127
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Conclusion
We have two objectives in this Article. The first is to bring the issue of
micropolitan areas into the debate about regionalism and metropolitanism. The
characteristics of micropolitan areas suggest that they deserve independent
treatment that complicates the debate about regionalism, a treatment that gets lost
in the traditional urban/rural dichotomy. The second has been to make normative
claims about how best to promote economic development within micropolitan areas
and to speculate about the possibility that economic development within
micropolitan areas could reduce political polarization along the urban/rural divide.
Our claims, however, are limited by a paucity of data that might support or refute
our largely speculative claims. We conclude, therefore, by suggesting areas of
research that we believe would provide valuable information about the
characteristics of micropolitan areas.
We have proposed that development of micropolitan areas would generate
political as well as economic benefits by reducing polarization. Given that some
micropolitan areas are relatively successful, that proposal provides a testable
hypothesis. One could, for example, compare voting patterns in economically
successful micropolitan areas with voting patterns in less successful micropolitan
areas to determine whether the spread in voting by party affiliation is greater in one
group than in the other.
Similarly, social contact theory suggests that inducing interactions among
diverse groups could reduce friction. But the effect appears to be greater with
respect to some diverse groups, e.g., economically diverse groups, than with respect
to other groups, e.g., racially diverse groups. Are relatively successful micropolitan
areas less racially diverse than relatively unsuccessful micropolitan areas?
Finally, we have suggested that principal city subsidies of rural areas could
promote regional benefits. If that is the case, however, then we would expect to
find more evidence of subsidies or interlocal agreements within relative successful
micropolitan areas. We are not, however, aware of any evidence one way or the
other on that proposition.
Micropolitan areas remain an understudied area. Additional research could
provide valuable information concerning the distinctions among such areas, the
mechanisms for regional development, the effectiveness of interlocal cooperation,
and the depth of our political polarization. At the moment we can only theorize
about these issues. Ultimately, however, they are too important to leave to
speculation.
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